By applying the rational choice principal-agent model, this article examines the European Union member states' principal control of the European External Action Service (EEAS) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal-agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the EEAS. These mechanisms aim to ensure the EEAS's compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the EEAS is tightly controlled by the EU member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. The application of the principal-agent model to control the EEAS is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.
Introduction
The European Union's (EU) incoherent and ineffective response to international developments so far this century has highlighted the need to improve the Union's external action. A major attempt to address the shortcomings took shape in the framework of the European Convention (2002) (2003) , where the EU member states and supranational institutions laid the foundation for the institutional modifications that were intended to invigorate EU foreign policy. The European Convention proposed several novelties, such as the creation of the posts of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will also hold the position of the European Commission's Vice-President (HR/VP). The proposal to establish the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the centrepiece of the EU's revamped foreign policy architecture.
After the failure of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty (2005), the actual establishment of the EEAS was postponed until the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Analysis of the negotiation process reveals that the EEAS is the product of a compromise between the EU member states, the Commission and the European Parliament. The outcome of the compromise is evident in the EEAS's sui generis nature of being neither a supranational nor an intergovernmental body: having unique linkages with the EU member states; being somewhat accountable to the European Parliament; and receiving a requirement to cooperate with the European Commission. Not only does the EEAS connect the rest of the EU's external actors through assisting, supporting and cooperating, it also employs its own staff members from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the EU member states' diplomatic services.1
Although the EEAS was built on the EU's existing structures, its hybrid institutional composition is a new experiment for the EU, which already had a very sophisticated institutional architecture. It is therefore puzzling that rather than shift power to the Council Presidency or the Council Secretariat, over which the member states have more control,2 the 'non-integrationist' member states agreed to delegate powers to the EEAS agent, which has a very complex structure, is placed outside of the Council, and operates in both communitarian and intergovernmental decision-making modes. The establishment of a new agent with unprecedented characteristics raises questions about whether the member states that delegated the EEAS's discretion to manage the EU's external action on their behalf are indeed able to monitor and control effectively the actions of the EEAS. By applying the principal-agent model, this article examines the member states' principal control of the EEAS agent. establishment of the EEAS's organization and functioning, but also adds to our knowledge of the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture in general.
The article finds that the EU member states closely monitor and control the EEAS through so-called 'police patrol' , which is a direct monitoring of an agent by a principal. Moreover, the Commission has tools for 'horizontal checks' of the EEAS, which is a mechanism of an indirect control. The European Parliament, which played an important role in the establishment process of the EEAS, is an outlier to the principal-agent model.
After this introductory section, the article presents the principal-agent framework. Analysis in the third section focuses on the ex-ante control of the EEAS. The fourth section details ex-post police patrol and horizontal checkmonitoring and control of the EEAS agent. Fifth, the article identifies the possibility of sanctioning the EEAS through staffing, financing and agency revision. The final section sums up and discusses the main findings.
The Principal-Agent Model and Control of the EEAS
A principal-agent relationship is 'created when one party, the principal, enters into a contractual agreement with a second part, the agent, and delegates responsibility to the latter for carrying out a function or set of tasks on the principal's behalf' .8 Following Hawkins et al., the 'principal' is defined as the actor capable of both granting and withdrawing power.9 In the application of the model, this article considers the EU member states as sole principal, since only they can delegate power to the EEAS agent to act on their behalf. Unlike the vertical and hierarchical relations between the EU member states' principal and the EEAS agent, the Commission's relations with the EEAS are horizontal and non-hierarchical. However, applying the principal-agent model to the control of the EEAS is not without limits, especially when conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to the model. The principal-agent model assumes that a principal delegates its power to an agent to maximize the possibility of achieving the pursued objectives or to ensure the credibility of the principal's commitment. The agent, however, is perceived as 'self-interest seeking with guile'10 that is able to develop its own preferences over time and to strive for their realization. Therefore, the principal is faced with the challenge of obtaining 'perfect compliance from agents' .11 The principal's willingness to transfer power to a given agent is thus conditioned by its ability to control the agent.12
The principal sets control mechanisms that aim to tie the agent to the granted mandate and thus to minimize the agent's ability to pursue its own objectives independent of the principal. Through control mechanisms, the principal retains the ability to 'mitigate conflicts of interest through the careful design of incentive contracts but can rarely control agents perfectly' .13 Paradoxically, containing agency losses might require 'undertaking measures that are themselves costly'14 and can therefore undo the anticipated benefits of delegation. The principal thus seeks to strike a balance between the control and autonomy of an agent in a way that would allow the agent to perform its mandate effectively.
This study assembles the control mechanisms of the EEAS in ex-ante -that is, before establishment of the EEAS -and ex-post -that is, after establishment of the EEAS -groups, continued by its sanctioning through staffing, budget and revision of the mandate. Ex-ante administrative procedures intend to define the scope of agency activities, outline the legal instruments (for example, regulation and economic incentives) and set the procedures that an agent is required to follow in performing delegated functions.15 Administrative requirements are useful, in particular for the purpose of combating infor-mational asymmetries, but are not sufficient for the effective control of agency activities.
The principal therefore resorts to ex-post oversight procedures to monitor and control the agency's activity.16 So-called 'police patrol' by the EU memberstate principals provides the means for direct monitoring of the behaviour of the EEAS agent. Moreover, the Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. In addition, the EEAS is accountable to the European Parliament in a number of areas (such as budget and staff). The information collected through monitoring is particularly valuable if used to reward or 'sanction' the agent in a manner that incentivizes the agent 'to comply with the principal's objectives and intentions' .17 The principals may sanction their agent for non-compliance with the stipulated mandate, specifically through staffing, financing and revision of the mandate.
Ex-Ante Control of the EEAS
The European Convention (2002) (2003) was the forum for the conception of the EEAS. The Convention's Working Group on External Action was the first to put forward a blueprint for the establishment and functioning of the EEAS and the post of its head -the HR/VP. In its final report, the Convention's Working Group suggested a number of scenarios for the reconstruction of EU external action. The first scenario proposed measures that would strengthen the role of the HR and create synergies between the competences of the HR and the DG External Relations (Relex) Commissioner, while keeping the two functions separate. Another option was to merge the functions of the HR and the Relex Commissioner and to bring the new HR under the direct authority of the President of the European Council. The report also put forward the option of a full merger of the HR with the Commission, while safeguarding the specificity of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) decision-making.18 The latter option, in particular, was supported by the European Commission and the European Parliament,19 since it was in line with the interest of the institutions to strengthen the supranational character 16 The eventual establishment of the EEAS and HR/VP was the result of a compromise that had already been proposed by the Convention between two major camps of the EU member states. According to this option, the new HR/VP combines his/her predecessor's and the Relex Commissioner's mandates and is supported by the EEAS, which is neither part of the Commission nor part of the Council Secretariat. On the one hand, the compromise on the EEAS made it possible for the member states that were against the integration of EU foreign policy to maintain their control over the EU's external action. If the EEAS is to be integrated into the European Commission, EU foreign policy would become more communitarian, giving the EU's supranational institutions a greater say in decision-making at the expense of the EU member states' control. Starting from a neo-realist interpretation, Michael Kluth and Jess Pilegaard argue that the United Kingdom and France compromised on the establishment of the EEAS to compensate for their decreasing global influence.21 London and Paris expected the EEAS to act in line with their foreign offices because of their dominance. On the other hand, the EEAS was not merged with the Council's structures, where the EU member states have even greater control,22 thus satisfying the pro-integration member states and institutions.
As in the pre-Lisbon Treaty stage, the member states maintain tighter and more direct control in areas where the EU conducts its CFSP and CSDP than over issues beyond the CFSP.23 Although the EU acquired a 'single legal personality' , the so-called communitarian and intergovernmental areas of EU external action preserve their separate decision-making procedures.24 Therefore, decision-making in the area of the CFSP has formally remained intergovernmental. In practice, this division is visible in the structure of the EEAS, where units dealing with the CSDP are isolated from the geographical units.25 Distinctive control mechanisms for each of these areas govern the decisionmaking processes and are therefore ex-ante transferred into respective functions covered by the EEAS. Moreover, in order to ensure the continuation of the existing EU member states' competences in the CFSP, the member states attached provisions to the 'Final Act' of the Lisbon Treaty at the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The declaration states that the establishment of the new HR post and the EEAS shall not affect member states' foreign policy, their national representation in third countries, or international organizations. Moreover, the provision adds that CFSP decision-making shall not prejudice member states' security policy.
Although the Lisbon Treaty conferred on the HR/VP the right to make proposals on the establishment of the EEAS, on 1 December 2009 the European Council endorsed the proposal prepared by the Council's rotating presidency before the HR/VP (Catherine Ashton) was appointed. The European Council therefore limited the discretion prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty for the HR/VP, stripping her of the advantage of the first mover and in practice providing her with 'guidelines' to follow.26 The presidency proposal brokered in the framework of COREPER II (the Comité des représentants permanents, Committee of Permanent Representatives -in this case, heads of mission) sets out inter alia the EEAS's legal status, scope, financing, staff delegations and the authority of the HR.
Through the negotiation process that started in the European Convention and resulted in the Lisbon Treaty and the Council's decision establishing the EEAS, the EU member states sketched out the scope of EEAS activity, outlined the instruments to be used by the EEAS and set the procedures that the EEAS was mandated to follow. Analysis of ex-ante control points to the restrictive administrative procedures that the member states apply in order to control the EEAS. Although these procedures play a significant role in keeping the agent in line with its mandate, they do not provide sufficient grounds to combat possible opportunistic behaviour by an agent. Moreover, the sensitivity of foreign policy and the changing strategic political environment, in addition to lack of guarantees that the EEAS will actually follow its contractual obligations and not engage in opportunistic behaviour, make the creation and application of ex-post control mechanisms a logical choice.
Ex-Post Control of the EEAS
Police Patrol Police patrol oversight refers to the active monitoring of an agent directly by the principal, with the purpose of identifying agency violations of the goals that are inherent in the contractual relationship between principal and agent. Monitoring of the agency's activity by the principal is carried out on a regular basis. However, police patrol involves the principal's active participation and therefore comes with a high cost.27 The member state principals use the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the CFSP-related Council working groups as forums for monitoring and controlling the EEAS's action in EU foreign policy decision-making. An EEAS official shared: 'The member states assume that we should think what they think and my colleagues also often ask: "What would the member states think?" '28
Through the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council was designated as an EU institution with a permanent President elected for two and a half years, renewable once. In practice, the European Council became a central player in the EU's external action, especially by setting the guidelines of EU foreign policy.29 The member states are represented in the European Council through their heads of state and government. The HR/VP participates in the European Council without being its member.
The Lisbon Treaty divided the Council into the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC COREPER II comprises EU member states' ambassadors working on political, commercial, economic and institutional matters and preparing the FAC meeting. In contrast to the FAC, PSC and CFSP-related groups, COREPER II is not chaired by the HR/VP or the EEAS, but instead by the Council's rotating presidency. An EEAS official highlighted in an interview the consequences of this arrangement: 'For example, the summits are prepared by the EEAS in different working groups, but then the final discussion is in COREPER, chaired by the rotating presidency, which might not have great interest in that particular summit or in that particular agenda' .33 Although the EEAS currently participates in COREPER II meetings through a member of a corporate board, COREPER II ambassadors often sideline the HR/VP and the EEAS. The ambassadors hold working dinners up to five times a week. They meet for coffee and lunch breaks. Besides formal meetings, they also meet in smaller groups to resolve differences. 34 The PSC, which is responsible for monitoring issues relating to CFSP/CSDP, has been gaining in importance in preparing the EU's foreign policy dossiers and has become an actor in its own right. Although COREPER II has the competence to approve issues that were agreed in the PSC, its agenda is so heavy that it instead mostly ends up approving the decisions that are made by the PSC.35 Although the EEAS chairs the PSC, post-Lisbon modifications mean that its discretion has remained limited. The EEAS has not been able to resist the member states putting their priorities on the PSC's agenda. The EEAS's failure to prevent the PSC trip to Moldova and Ukraine is but one example.36 Post-Lisbon arrangements not only changed the chairs of the FAC and the PSC, but also altered the chairmanship of the Council working groups that are related to the CFSP. Currently, the EEAS replaces the rotating presidency in chairing sixteen working groups.37 Formally, the working group chairpersons appointed from the EEAS answer to the PSC chair and the HR/VP. They are responsible for organizing the meetings and determining the agenda within the group. However, a chairperson explained the limits of his agenda-setting powers by posing a rhetorical question: 'Formally I can say no to a member state about putting an issue on the agenda, but would it be in my interest?'38 Therefore, the EU member states control the EEAS in the Council working groups, both through their formal decision-making rights and through informally influencing the agenda-setting competence of the chair.
Horizontal Checks vis-à-vis the EEAS
The principal may establish several agencies with conflicting incentives that may well check each other through competition for the reasons of their survival or competence maximization. Since the resources are limited in a given institutional framework, rational agents compete, which creates 'indirect mechanisms of control, a form of mutual restraint or "horizontal control" ' .39 As stated above, the European Commission has tools to play the role of horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS.
In theory, the HR's functions as the European Commission's Vice-President and head of the EEAS are the highest-level links between the Commission and the EEAS. In practice, however, a Commission official shared in an interview Despite the Lisbon Treaty's intention to bring more coherence to EU external action through the establishment of the new HR/VP post and the EEAS, in practice the division between development (dominated by the Commission) and security policy (dominated by the EEAS) was maintained.46 The HR/VP and the EEAS are charged with contributing the EU's external action instruments. However, the EU's development-related instruments (see more below) remain within the Commission's responsibility. 47 It is yet to be seen whether the EEAS's 2013 review, the cluster system since 2014 with the new group of External Relations Commissioners under the chairmanship of the HR/VP and the creation of the DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) will facilitate improvement of the relationship between the EEAS and the European Commission.
The European Parliament as an Outlier
As a result of the post-Lisbon Treaty modifications in general and the establishment of the EEAS in particular, the European Parliament widened its powers in a number of areas of EU external action and vis-à-vis the EEAS. Elisabeth Wisniewski argues that because of the strong democratic profile of the European Parliament, as well as inter-institutional dynamics and constraints, the European Parliament managed to gain more power than the Lisbon Treaty The MEPs succeeded in broadening the HR/VP's obligation to inform the European Parliament about the aspects of the CFSP before their adoption.52 The European Parliament's role in concluding the EU's international agreements was also strengthened. However, unlike the agreements falling under community matters, the European Parliament's consent is still not required in CFSP areas. The European Parliament extended its supervisory role over the appointment of EU foreign policy actors (see below). In the budgetary sense, the EEAS was made accountable to the European Parliament (also see below). The European Parliament was also successful in its efforts to stress the promotion of democracy and human rights as an important aspect of the EEAS's actions. A day before the European Parliament gave its approval to the decision establishing the EEAS, the HR/VP promised serious attention for democracy and human rights promotion.53 Replacement of the HR/VP in the plenary of the European Parliament remains a contentious issue and is likely to be reopened in the upcoming revision in 2015. Under the current arrangement, the HR/VP will be replaced either by the relevant Commissioner or by a representative of the rotating or trio presidency (that is, three successive presidencies working closely together).
Whereas the European Parliament has certainly increased its role in EU external action and the EEAS is somewhat accountable to MEPs, it cannot be considered to be a principal, since the European Parliament does not have the power to delegate to the EEAS. The European Parliament cannot be considered as a horizontal check vis-à-vis the EEAS, since it is not an 'executive' body and does not operate at the level of an agent implementing EU external action, but instead exercises a legislative, supervisory and budgetary role. The principal-agent framework therefore does not capture the role of the European Parliament.
Controlling through Sanctions
Staff Principals may use their power of appointment -namely, to appoint, dismiss or refuse to reappoint agency personnel -as a tool to sanction agents. The applicability of the power of appointments as a control tool by the principal is conditioned by the rules governing the contractual relationship between the agent and the principal. In some cases, the principal is in a good position to use the power of appointment as a tool to control agency activity. By contrast, in other cases, when an agent has to ensure the credibility of the principal's commitments, the appointing powers of the principal are reduced to maximize the independence of the agency's activity.54
In the EU structure, the option of using the power of appointment by the member-state principals to control EU agents varies across institutions and functions. Although the HR/VP is consecrated as 'the Appointing Authority' , the principals' power over EEAS staffing is a major controlling tool. In the early
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (2016) 26-48 days of the EEAS, the EU member states aimed to establish control of the service, in particular through securing key positions for their representatives.
The HR/VP is appointed and can also be fired by the European Council in agreement with the Commission President. The HR must then be approved as a VP of the Commission with the rest of the College by the European Parliament. The EU member states insisted on having at least one-third of the EEAS coming from the member states' national diplomatic services. An extra motivating factor for the United Kingdom and France in agreeing to the establishment of the EEAS was the calculation that they would be able to dominate EU foreign policy by sending their highly capable diplomats to the EEAS.55
The relevant Commission and Council Secretariat staff were transferred to the EEAS immediately, but appointments from the member states' domestic diplomatic services progressed slowly. Filling the EEAS appointments illustrates competition between the EU member states in aiming to control the EEAS by having their national representatives in key positions. In Fund (EDF)71 are the responsibility of the Development Commissioner.72 Other external instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability or civilian aspects of the CFSP (but not expenditure of the CSDP), are also funded from the community budget.73 The EEAS also shares with the European Commission the control over the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 74 The Commission therefore still controls a large bulk of foreign policy expenditure, thus limiting the discretion of the EEAS.
As well as the EU member states and the European Commission, also the European Parliament acquired strong budgetary authority over the EEAS. The European Parliament successfully insisted on recognition of the EEAS as the equivalent of an institution in budgetary matters. The intergovernmental budget line for the EEAS was rejected and the EEAS is fully funded under the community budget. Like the rest of the EU institutions, the EEAS therefore has its own budget section and acts within the limits set by the financial regulations applicable to the EU general budget. In practice, this means that the EEAS's budget is subject to the discharge procedure, similar to other EU institutions, and is therefore accountable to the European Parliament. its autonomy through agency revision. On the other hand, EU member-state governments may boost the competences of an agent in order to provide it with extra tools to maximize the possibility of achieving their objectives.
The agent's mandate can be revised through treaty change and Council decisions. Modifying an agent's mandate through treaties has proved to be the most effective yet most complicated option. Mark Pollack calls it the 'nuclear option' and an ultimate threat against the agent by the principal.77 Treaty revision, however, is a fairly complicated process that engages the Council, the IGCs and supranational institutions and requires agreement by unanimity and ratification by each EU member state. The failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) and the long road to enactment of the Lisbon Treaty are but examples that illustrate the complexity of the process. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned constraints have not forced the EU member states to abandon the treaty-revision option. Such a revision was successfully carried out eight times in the last five decades, although each case had its own rationale, met different kinds of challenges and overcame them in rather innovative ways.
Devising Council decisions where the details of the agency mandate are outlined is yet another option for agency revision. Since Council decisions are not part of a treaty, the legislative principal has the 'power to override agency behaviour through new legislation and to revise the administrative procedures laid down in the agent's mandate' ,78 without resorting to the long and exhaustive 'nuclear option' . Moreover, a number of the European Commission's executive powers that are established by Council regulations have an 'expiration date' . The existence of a fixed expiration date within the agent's mandate provides the principal with the possibility of avoiding a 'default condition' ,79 since the agent's mandate has to be extended and is automatically open to further revisions.
The EEAS is a product of consequent delegation and agency revisions through treaty-making and Council decisions. The EU member states have revised the European Commission's and Council Secretariat's mandates through treaty changes and Council decisions and have created, inter alia, the post of the HR/VP and the EEAS. In order to make the EEAS operational, the 'quadrilogues' have interpreted and elaborated the treaty provisions in the Council decisions. The Council decision that established the EEAS identified 2014 as the timeframe to revise the organization and functioning of the EEAS based on the HR/ VP.80 This revision, however, was postponed until 2015. Specifying the date for revision of the EEAS decision plays the role of an 'expiration date' for the first stage of the contractual relationship between the EU member states as principal and the EEAS as agent. This excludes the 'default condition' , since the EEAS's mandate is automatically open for modification. As far as formal decision-making goes, the member states -in the Council framework -retain the right to revise their decision, with the European Commission consenting and the European Parliament having a consultative role. The EU member states will acquire the opportunity to revise the EEAS's mandate, but this can only be assessed after 2015.
Conclusions
The EU member states have actively participated in every stage of the EEAS's creation and activity. By revising the European Commission's mandate and transferring some functions that were formerly performed by the Council Secretariat, the EU member states as the principal have been the driving force behind the EEAS. Through ex-ante administrative procedures, the EU member states defined the framework of the EEAS's actions, outlined the instruments that it is expected to implement and described the procedures that it has to follow.
The EEAS is ex-post monitored and controlled through so-called 'police patrol' and horizontal checks. The EU member states 'police patrol' the EEAS through the European Council, FAC, COREPER, the PSC and the CFSP-related Council working groups. The HR/VP and the EEAS chair the FAC, PSC and a number of relevant working groups. Conversely, COREPER is chaired by the rotating presidency. Analysis of the decision-making in the Council structures reveals that the member states' representatives are effectively in charge of the EU foreign-policy decision-making process in general and the EEAS in particular.
The EEAS is tied to the European Commission on multiple levels, starting from the services up to the HR/VP. The linkages between the Commission DGs in dealing with the European Union's external relations and the EEAS often result in tensions that serve the purpose of horizontal checks. The European Parliament managed to use its co-decision powers in financial and staff regulation to acquire a role of co-decider in the decision establishing the EEAS, although in the latter case the Lisbon Treaty ascribes a merely consultative role to the European Parliament. The European Parliament was successful in extending its political control over the HR/VP and the EEAS.
The ex-post monitoring of the EEAS is complemented by the mechanism of sanctions, such as appointments, financing and revision of the mandate that the EU member states (can) implement to control the EEAS's activities. In terms of personnel, the EU member states have the right to hire and fire the HR/VP. By inserting their representative in the service, the member states aim to retain strong control over EU foreign policy. The European Commission receives the right to approve the HR's appointment and the European Parliament gives consent to the HR as a VP of the European Commission with the rest of the College of Commissioners. EU member states, along with the European Parliament, decide on the budget of the EEAS, which is presented by the European Commission after receiving the HR/VP's estimate of the EEAS's expenses accompanied by a report on the staff of the EEAS in both the central administration and the delegations. Before submitting the expenses to the European Commission, the HR/VP holds consultations with the Commissioners for Development, Neighbourhood and Humanitarian Aid policies in order to estimate the administrative expenditure of the EEAS.
The EEAS has been established through treaty-making and Council decisions that have revised the Commission's and the Council Secretariat's mandate, transferring some of their departments and staff to the EEAS along with EU member states' diplomats. Based on Council decisions, the EEAS's mandate will continue to be revised. The HR/VP presented a review to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission in 2013. Formally, the EU member states enjoy the right to revise their decision establishing the EEAS after receiving the consent of the European Commission and consulting the European Parliament, both of which are expected to defend and expand their 'turf' .
Adding to the principal-agent literature, this case confirms that an agent that is delegated competences in a politically sensitive issue-area such as foreign policy -a central aspect of the nation-state principal's sovereigntyis tightly controlled by the delegating principal and did exhibit unwarranted opportunistic behaviour in the early years of its existence. Moreover, the analysis finds that the principal-agent framework is suitable for evaluating the member states' control over the EEAS, as well as the horizontal checks that are
